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Mao and Giap on Partisan Warfare
Balázs FORGÁCS1
According to Liddell Hart: “He [Mao] progressively developed his guerrillas into 
regular forces, while exploiting a combination of the two forms of warfare.” [1: 363] 
Mao Tse-tung is considered to be one of the most determinative of all guerrilla 
warfare2 theoreticians, whose works and ideas in the field of military science had 
a great impact on irregular warfare during the Cold War and they still continue 
to do so nowadays. One of the most famous followers of the Chinese revolutionary 
was Vo Nguyen Giap, under whose military leadership the Vietnamese defeated 
both the French and the Americans. Based on primary resources, this essay 
summarises the most significant ideas on guerrilla/partisan warfare by the two 
military theoreticians. This essay was supported by the János Bolyai Research 
Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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Introduction
The evolution of guerrilla warfare theories is characterised by the take over and adaption to 
the local circumstances of the theoretical—but practical experience based—works of other 
theoreticians. Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap played central roles in the development 
of guerrilla warfare theories: after taking over the ideas from 19th [2] and early 20th century 
classics, [3] they adapted and improved them according to the circumstances of the Chinese 
Civil War and the fighting taking place in Indochina. Their works provided a model for 
insurgencies in the later part of the 20th century, but their impact can also be felt even today.
At the turn of the century, the question arose whether guerrilla forces are able to achieve 
victory alone against regular forces. Fighting on the Arabian Peninsula highlighted the 
fact that irregular forces are only able to achieve complete victory when complemented by 
regular units. However, what can one do if there are no such units available? The answer to 
this question was provided by Chinese communist leader Mao Tse-tung. Vo Nguyen Giap 
was both a theoretical and a practical follower of Mao and in his own works of military 
science, he underlined the significance of indirect ways, especially that of the national and 
international propaganda next to military operations.
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Mao on Guerrilla Warfare
One of the most significant military and political theoretician of guerrilla warfare was Mao 
Tse-tung. In summarising his experiences from the civil war against the Koumintang from 
1927, and from the fight against the Japanese during the Second World War, he highlighted 
that without the cooperation of the regular units of the Chinese Red Army and the partisan 
forces, war could not be fought successfully. According to the own poetic words of 
the Chinese party leader “Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations 
of the people’s guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each 
other like a man’s right arm and left arm, and if we had only the main forces of the Red 
Army without the people’s guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm.” [4] 
He thought that in the war against Japan, the Chinese regular units were to play the decisive 
role, but the supplementary role of partisan forces was also indispensable for a successful 
fight. Mao saw it correctly that the struggle against the Japanese was to last for a long time, 
since the Chinese first had to train those armed forces, which can later successfully engage 
the foreign invaders. This prolonged war favoured the Chinese, who prepared thoroughly 
for the counterattack at their base areas.
As far as the relationship between military and the political leadership is concerned, Mao 
clearly stated the subordinate role of the military in achieving the political aims. The leading 
role of politics was drawn up in the political objectives, which had to be clearly and precisely 
communicated to the people, and among them the members of the military, as well.
The head of the Chinese communists further underlined that it was especially 
important for the officers of the armed forces to study political guidelines. This way, they 
may understand the connection between politics and the military, or in other words, they 
comprehend that military operations are used to achieve political aims. [5]
From the works of Mao, it becomes clear that he took many ideas from the classics of 
Marxism–Leninism, especially from the works of Lenin. In his work on partisan warfare, 
he quotes the thoughts of the Russian revolutionary many times, whose works in turn were 
significantly influenced by Carl von Clausewitz and his epic On War. Thus, it may be assumed 
that the works of Lenin played an important role and acted as a bridge between the Chinese 
communist and the main work of Clausewitz. Based on quotations taken from the Prussian 
theoretician [5] [6] it is fair to say that Mao—as a follower of Lenin—accepted the idea of 
Clausewitz that politics determines military affairs. Popular uprising got its own separate 
chapter in the work of Clausewitz, which might have been known by Mao, too. However, he 
could only identify himself with the Clausewitzian theory on popular uprising partially, as 
Clausewitz thought that such warfare was only possible under the guidance and leadership 
of the emperor, and that its aim was to fight against the invaders, and not for a new social 
order as propagated by the communists.
The role of political control can be found in the sections about organising partisan 
troops as well: the military commanders of Chinese insurgent units were accompanied by 
political commissioners, who represented the lowest rank of political control. [5] On the unit 
commander level, next to the leading military commander, political commissioners were also 
appointed, in whose subordination worked officials responsible for organising propaganda 
matters and mass demonstrations. Party leaders ordered the setup of committees in partisan 
areas of responsibility, in which the representatives of both the political and the military side 
B. FORGÁCS: Mao and Giap on Partisan Warfare
(18) 2 (2019) 33
worked together. The delegates of the party were responsible for the political and ideological 
work on a unit level, as well. In an indirect manner, they aided the achievement of war goals 
with their political work among the troops, the populace and even the enemy, since [5] “clearly 
then the protracted revolutionary struggle in the revolutionary base areas consists mainly in 
peasant guerrilla warfare led by the Chinese Communist Party”. [7]
Mao divided wars of national liberation into three phases, which classification he took 
over from Marx [8] and developed. The first phase is characterised by strategic offence of 
the enemy, and strategic defence by the Chinese; in the second phase the enemy settles into 
strategic defence, while the Chinese prepare for strategic offence; the third phase is the time 
for the Chinese strategic counterattack and strategic withdrawal for the enemy. Partisan 
forces take part in all three phases. In the first and in the final phases, they act as auxiliaries 
for the regular units, but their fighting is the most important during the second phase, 
when—operating in the rear of the enemy—they constantly attrite the Japanese forces. [6] 
Partisan forces also develop during the fighting, and as Mao said: “In saying this we also 
have in mind the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare.” [6] 
“It is also beyond doubt that in the long course of struggle the guerrilla units and guerrilla 
warfare will not remain as they are but will develop to a higher stage and evolve gradually 
into regular units and regular warfare.” [9] This change in applying violence can be found 
in other thoughts of Mao too, which were also highlighted by Liddell Hart: “Mao step by 
step converted his guerrilla troops into a regular army, while also being able to join the two 
ways of warfare.” [1: 363]
According to Mao, irregular warfare had many advantages in the war against the 
Japanese: it shrank the area occupied by the enemy and in parallel widened the base areas 
of their own regular units; it disencumbered the regular fighting forces; provided troop 
replenishment for the army; helped the populace in the rear of the enemy and with this it 
expanded the influence of the Chinese Communist Party in parallel; lowered the moral of 
the Japanese and at the same time raised the moral of the Chinese. [9]
Mao summed up the strategic programme of partisan warfare as follows: “(1) the use 
of initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles 
of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line 
operations; (2) co-ordination with regular warfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) the 
strategic defensive and the strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into 
mobile warfare; and (6) correct relationship of command.” [10] According to him, partisan 
warfare is a very unique kind of belligerency: “Generally speaking, mobile warfare 
performs the task of annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and 
guerrilla warfare performs both simultaneously.” [6]
Along with the regular units, the struggle of the partisan was also aided by the populace. 
Furthermore, without their support, the irregular warfare of the partisan becomes impossible 
in the rear areas of the enemy. For this reason, it is particularly vital to gain and maintain 
the kindliness and support of the populace. As Mao explained with a metaphor: “Many 
people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy’s rear. Such a belief 
reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and 
the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may 
it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the 
people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.” [5]
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When communicating with the people, clarity and brevity were the greatest advantage 
of Mao over his rivals. His metaphors, short examples and thoughts broken down into clear 
points were effective in communicating his message to every layer of society, especially 
to the lower classes, those the communists relied on mostly as their demographic basis. 
He greatly appreciated the role of propaganda: he prescribed that every bigger partisan 
unit shall have a mimeograph, and should print newspapers and leaflets to ensure that the 
population is informed and to also gain their support. [5]
The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention was aimed at 
persuading them, and also served as a sort of “ethical codex” to prepare the staff of the 
Chinese Red Army, later renamed the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As early as 
1928—right after the fighting broke out—Mao already published his directive in three points 
on how to deal with the populace: “(1) Obey orders in your actions; (2) Don’t take anything 
from the workers and peasants; and (3) Turn in all things taken from local bullies.” [11]
He further supplemented these rules with six more remarks in the summer of the same 
year. These were: “(1) Put back the doors you have taken down for bed-boards; (2) Put back 
the straw you have used for bedding; (3) Speak politely; (4) Pay fairly for what you buy; (5) 
Return everything you borrow; and (6) Pay for anything you damage.” [11] After 1929, Mao 
changed some of those points. The second rule was replaced by “Don’t take a single needle 
or piece of thread from the masses!”, while the third one changed two times: first to “Turn in 
all money raised!”, which was later made more specific by “Turn in everything captured!”. 
The already existing six points were also expanded by two more: “Don’t bathe within sight 
of women” and “Don’t search the pockets of captives”. Finally, on 10 October 1947, he sent 
the document below to the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army:
“1. Our Army’s Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention have been 
practiced for many years, but their contents vary slightly in army units in different 
areas. They have now been unified and are hereby reissued. It is expected that you will 
take this version as the standard one for thorough education and strict enforcement. As 
to other matters needing attention, the high command of the armed forces in different 
areas may lay down additional points in accordance with specific conditions and order 
their enforcement.
2.  The Three Main Rules of Discipline are as follows:
(1) Obey orders in all your actions.
(2) Don’t take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
(3) Turn in everything captured.
3.  The Eight Points for Attention are as follows:
(1) Speak politely.
(2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
(3) Return everything you borrow.
(4) Pay for anything you damage.
(5) Don’t hit or swear at people.
(6) Don’t damage crops.
(7) Don’t take liberties with women.
(8) Don’t ill-treat captives.” [11]
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Mao also modified the relationship between popular support and the partisans: while Marx, 
Engels and Lenin all thought that the poverty-stricken proletarian of the cities is going to 
form the popular basis of the revolutionary struggle, in China it was the populace of the 
countryside—the peasantry—which provided manpower for the partisans. The explanation 
is to be found in the different societal structures: In the less industrialised China—compared 
to Europe—there were only a few factories and consequently a much smaller number of 
industrial workers, while the number of the peasantry in the countryside proved perfectly 
sufficient for growing the number of partisan units.
Mao also defined the term base area: “What, then, are these base areas? They are the 
strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and 
achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving 
out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying 
out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war.” [10] He highlighted that 
these were to be defended at all costs, since these lands are the showpiece examples of 
the new social order, and their defence provides the supporting background via which the 
guerrilla troops can become regular units. These difficult to access, well camouflaged, well 
protected—if required—and preferably as large as possible base areas served not only as 
starting points of offensives, but they were also the place where new units were organised, 
the troops rested and secured their resupply. [12] [13]
General Giap on Guerrilla Warfare
Vietnam fought for its independence for close to three decades, first against the French and 
later against the Americans. This struggle against the invaders was spearheaded by the 
leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party—headed by Ho Chi Minh—who enjoyed 
the superpower support of both the Soviet Union and China. It was General Vo Nguyen 
Giap, the commander of the Vietnamese armed forces who analysed the Vietnamese conflict 
from a military scientific and theoretical point of view, while also propagating the military 
victories. As a follower of Mao, he applied his experiences of the Chinese Civil War and the 
theories of left-wing theoreticians to the Vietnamese circumstances.
According to the Vietnamese general, the war of national liberation—due to its nature, 
and according to the Marxist theory—was a just war. While as far as the opposing forces 
were concerned—in modern terms—it was also an asymmetric conflict. In his most 
important works of military theory, Giap took over [14] [15] many ideas of the Maoist 
theory: [16: 43] the armed forces, which are subordinate to the political leadership of the 
party must win in a protracted conflict, since in such a prolonged war, one cannot only 
count on the weakening of the enemy, but also on its tiring, because the armed forces of 
the enemy are prepared for a fast, high intensity conflict. [14: 53–54] [15: 112–113] The 
Vietnamese general defined guerrilla warfare as: “Guerrilla warfare is the form of fighting 
of the masses of people, of the people of a weak and badly equipped country who stand up 
against an aggressive army which possesses better equipment and technique. This is the way 
of fighting the revolutionary war which relies on the heroic spirit to triumph over modern 
weapons, avoiding the enemy when he is the stronger and attacking him when he is the 
weaker, now scattering, now regrouping one’s forces, now wearing out, now exterminating 
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the enemy, determined to fight him everywhere, so that wherever the enemy goes he would 
be submerged in a sea of armed people who hit back at him, thus undermining his spirit 
and exhausting his forces.” [15: 118–119] His popular support—due to the same economic 
reasons as in China—came from the peasantry of the countryside.
Similarly to Mao, Giap also took over from Marx the three phases of war: the first 
being the struggle in defence, the second being the time of balance, while the third the 
phase of counteroffensive. [15: 114–115] He dedicated a key role for the guerrillas in all 
three phases, but their role was the most significant in the first phase, as their activities 
provided the preconditions of the next two phases. The Vietnamese armed forces, formed 
under the command of Giap may be categorised into the following categories: “para-military 
organisations or guerrilla units, regional troops and regular units.” [14: 60] The Vietnamese 
general considered the guerrilla forces to be the core of the revolutionary armed forces: 
these units launch the armed struggle, from which the two other categories of units develop 
later. According to him, war has to be conducted with the combined application of all these 
levels, but only regular units can decisively defeat the enemy.
He stressed that one of the key prerequisites of winning the war is the development of 
mobile warfare next to the guerrilla war. “Mobile warfare is the fighting way of, concentrated 
troops, of the regular army in which relatively big forces are regrouped and operating on 
a relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where he is relatively exposed with a view 
to annihilating enemy manpower, advancing very deeply then withdrawing very swiftly, 
possessing to the extreme, dynamism, initiative, mobility and rapidity of decision in face 
of new situations”, [15: 120–121] but this assumes the creation of regular units. He wrote 
on the process of these that: “People’s war, long term war, guerrilla warfare developing step 
by step into mobile warfare, such are the most valuable lessons of the war of liberation in 
Viet Nam.” [14: 57–58] The fall/liberation of Dien Bien Phu [17] confirmed the theory of 
Giap “[i]n general, our Resistance War was a guerrilla war moving gradually to regular war, 
from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare combined with partial entrenched camp warfare”.
[15: 117] However, he also underlined that “it is necessary to develop guerrilla warfare 
into mobile warfare does not mean brushing aside guerrilla warfare, but that in the widely 
extended guerrilla activities, the units of the regular army gradually grew up and were able 
to wage mobile warfare and side by side with that main force there must always be numerous 
guerrilla troops and guerrilla activities”. [15: 122–123] “From the strategic point of view, 
guerrilla warfare, causing many difficulties and losses to the enemy, wears him out.” [15: 120] 
In summary of the above, it can be said that in the theory of Giap, guerrilla warfare naturally 
stayed as one of the forms of fighting, but its role in the last phase of war took an auxiliary 
role, as for the destruction of the enemy, a gradual transition among the revolutionary troops 
must occur towards mobile warfare. Next to indirect warfare, this shows the emergence and 
strengthening of direct warfare in the last phase.
Giap dedicated great roles to indirect tools next to the direct ways of employing strength, 
since “political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less 
important than propaganda”. [15: 89] About the role of national propaganda, he stressed that 
it has to be led by the party, and executed mostly by the national armed forces. The popular 
basis of the army can be setup with this, while also disrupting the enemy at the same time. 
The army setup in such a manner, is going to have a good relationship with the populace, as 
the same goals and the same enemy melts them into one. The fighting army also educates, 
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teaches and helps the people, who are giving the greatest support in exchange, all in order 
to achieve the joint goals. [14: 65] [15: 89] Propaganda however, should not only include big 
and rousing words: according to Giap, the party-lead nation building on communist-held 
areas is also providing huge moral support for the revolutionary war effort. [15: 116–117] 
While propaganda executed on the international scene is able to influence the world, and 
with it, even the public opinion of the enemy: war events broadcast by the media may turn 
the population of the enemy away from supporting the war, and as such impact the enemy 
negatively in an indirect manner.
Conclusion
The theory of guerrilla warfare was formed by historical experiences and local condi-
tions. The works of Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap illustrate this process beautifully, 
as both theoreticians used the ideas of their forerunners, as well as the social, geographical 
and political peculiarities of their respective battlefields for formulating their own theories 
on guerrilla warfare. The theories of Mao and Giap highlighted the fact that, although no 
armed struggle can be started without the guerrillas, their role is not exclusive anymore, 
since without organising regular units, the strategic goals cannot be achieved. As a con-
sequence of their contribution, such terms have become part of the theory on guerrilla 
warfare as: protracted war and its three stages, evolution of partisans into regular units, the 
importance of national and international support, the requirement of forming base areas, 
and the usage of national and international propaganda as an indirect tool. Their life-work 
can be identified both in South-American and African uprisings, as well as in irregular 
struggles fought by non-state actors nowadays. [18] [19]
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